looky here

COBRA I was the codename given to General Patton’s successful breakout thrust from France toward Germany during World War II. COBRA II is a detailed account of the equally successful thrust that took Baghdad in 2003. While the majority of the book focuses on that operation, significant portions are devoted to the invasion planning and follow-up, which the authors find deeply flawed. They name names, describe incredible bureaucratic infighting, identify errors in strategic guidance, and conclude that civilian decision making has no place in deciding the details involved in executing tactical military operations. Curiously, the terms intelligence, CIA, DIA, and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) do not appear in the index, but they appear frequently in the text. It is here that the authors describe the Defense Department’s attempt to assume intelligence primacy from the CIA. In this connection they argue that the judgment of a National Intelligence Council officer that the degree of contact between al-Qa’ida and Iraq was incidental is dismissed because DOD had already decided otherwise, with insufficient evidence. The CIA and DIA analyses regarding WMD are discussed in detail, with emphasis on Secretary Powell’s speech to the UN. The initial reliance on a suspect defector’s claims about biological weapons labs is described, as is the subsequent decision that it made no difference whether reports were accurate since the decision to go to war had been made. The consequences of the failure to account for Saddam’s irregular forces that would become the postwar insurgents, coupled with inaccurate assumptions that the Iraqi army would not fight, the coalition forces would be received as liberators, and the Iraqi institutions of government would survive the war, are analyzed in deplorable detail. COBRA II ends in 2003, with a discussion of the decisions made to dismantle the Iraqi military and government and the problems that have occurred since. It is not a pleasant story, but with its devastating documentation it is one that is hard to challenge.

Take a closer look at this part ” DOD had already decided otherwise, with insufficient evidence. The CIA and DIA analyses regarding WMD are discussed in detail, with emphasis on Secretary Powell’s speech to the UN. The initial reliance on a suspect defector’s claims about biological weapons labs is described” What do you see ? biological weapons labs and insufficient evidence insufficient my @$$ this was in 03 people the same programs are still going today!!

I have a few Qs for them what type of bio labs? who gose in and what comes out ? “It is not a pleasant story, but with its devastating documentation it is one that is hard to challenge” re read it think about it what other things did you find???

Agent Foxx

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